





WHISTLEBLOWING: EXAMINING VARIOUS 
APPROACHES TO WHAT CONSTITUTES 
“FACT” TO TRIGGER PROTECTION UNDER 
ARTICLE 33 OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION 
 
KRISTIAN SOLTES* 
I.  INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... 926 
II.  BACKGROUND: UNCAC ARTICLE 33 AND ITS 
VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS ............................................ 929 
A.  THE REASONABLE BELIEF APPROACH CONSIDERS 
REASONABLE BELIEF IN AN ALLEGATION A PROTECTED 
DISCLOSURE ......................................................................... 930 
B.  THE SPECIFIC OFFENSE APPROACH REQUIRES 
REASONABLE BELIEF AND MUST POINT TO A SPECIFIC 
BREACH OF LAW .................................................................. 933 
C.  THE MULTIPLE HURDLES APPROACH REQUIRES  
REASONABLE BELIEF, INDICATION OF A SPECIFIC BREACH 
OF LAW, DISCLOSURE OF UNKNOWN INFORMATION, AND 
REPORTING THROUGH EXTRA-EMPLOYMENT CHANNELS .... 936 
D.  A TYPICAL WHISTLEBLOWER CASE ..................................... 940 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2013, American University, Washington College of 
Law; M.A. Candidate, May 2014, American University, School of International 
Service; B.A., 2010, Pennsylvania State University, Schreyer Honors College. The 
author would like to thank Professor Robert Vaughn for his immense knowledge 
and assistance with this comment, the editors and staff of the American University 
International Law Review for their diligence and dedication, and his family and 
friends without whom nothing would be possible. 
  
926 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [27:4 
 
III. ANALYSIS: IS THERE AN IDEAL APPROACH? ................ 941 
A.  THE REASONABLE BELIEF APPROACH BEST ADVANCES 
THE PURPOSE OF UNCAC AND OFFERS A CLEAR 
STANDARD FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS ...................................... 942 
B.  THE SPECIFIC OFFENSE APPROACH RAISES THE BAR FOR 
PROTECTION BY UNFAIRLY REQUIRING DISCLOSURES TO 
POINT TO A SPECIFIC OFFENSE ............................................. 943 
C.  THE MULTIPLE HURDLES APPROACH CREATES 
ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS THAT OBFUSCATE THE LAW AND 
UPSET EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS ........................... 946 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................... 951 
A.  THE REASONABLE BELIEF APPROACH SHOULD BE 
ADVANCED IN ALL STATE PARTIES....................................... 951 
B.  THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST 
CORRUPTION SHOULD CLARIFY THE APPROPRIATE TEST 
TO DETERMINE WHAT CONSTITUTES “REASONABLE 
BELIEF” ................................................................................ 953 
C.  INSTITUTIONS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO MONITOR 
AND FACILITATE THE PROPER APPLICATION OF THE 
STANDARD ........................................................................... 954 
V.  CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 954 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the quest for a corruption-free world, states have implemented 
various measures targeting corruption at all levels of society.1 One 
 
 1. See Thomas R. Snider & Won Kidane, Combating Corruption Through 
International Law in Africa: A Comparative Analysis, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 691, 
700–15 (2007) (describing various anti-corruption efforts that have been 
implemented around the world, including the United States Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption, and the African Union Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Corruption); see also Rachel Beller, Note, 
Whistleblower Protection Legislation of the East and West: Can It Really Reduce 
Corporate Fraud and Improve Corporate Governance? A Study of the Successes 
and Failures of Whistleblower Protection Legislation in the US and China, 7 
N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 873, 876–77 (2011) (recognizing the importance of anti-
corruption and anti-fraud efforts in the United States and China via whistleblowing 
protection in the private sector). 
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measure, the facilitation of disclosure of information by those privy 
to such information, referred to as “whistleblowing,” is a relatively 
novel approach.2 Nevertheless, whistleblowing is now considered an 
essential component in the battle against corruption and has therefore 
gained considerable sway in the international arena.3 At the same 
time, any discussion regarding whistleblowing speaks to the fine 
balance between the battle against corruption and the related 
necessity for freedom of information on one side, and the privacy of 
information as well as the loyalty expected by the employers of 
potential whistleblowers on the other.4 However, regardless of where 
that elusory balance lies, the only way to properly implement 
whistleblower protection measures is by creating a clear standard of 
law that removes much of the guesswork that plagues effective 
whistleblower protection.5 
As an attempt to facilitate the implementation of anti-corruption 
efforts and whistleblower provisions around the world, the members 
of the United Nations agreed to the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption (“UNCAC”) in 2003.6 UNCAC as a whole 
strives to be a comprehensive framework dealing with corruption, 
 
 2. See Elleta Sangrey Callahan et al., Whistleblowing: Australian, U.K., and 
U.S. Approaches to Disclosure in the Public Interest, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 879, 880–
82 (2004) (discussing the recent legislative focus on whistleblowing, especially 
given recent scandals that have been uncovered or could have been uncovered by 
whistleblowers). 
 3. See Indira Carr & David Lewis, Combating Corruption Through 
Employment Law and Whistleblower Protection, 39 INDUS. L.J. 52, 53 (2010) 
(noting that because it is difficult to detect corruption and wrongdoing externally, 
whistleblowers are perfectly suited to uncover corrupt practices internally). 
 4. See Kevin Rubinstein, Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley 
Section 806: Balancing the Interests of Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 637, 641–42 (2007-08) (discussing the nature of whistleblowing as a 
compromise between the competing interests of employees, employers, and 
society). 
 5. See, e.g., PATRICIA MARTIN, OPEN DEMOCRACY ADVICE CENTRE, THE 
STATUS OF WHISTLEBLOWING IN SOUTH AFRICA: TAKING STOCK 104 (2010), 
available at 
http://www.archivalplatform.org/images/resources/ODAC_Whistleblowing_Repor
t_web.pdf (noting that effective implementation of whistleblowing measures in 
South Africa is hindered by a lack of knowledge of laws and concerns regarding 
the complexity of the process). 
 6. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter UNCAC]. 
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and Article 33 specifically addresses whistleblower protection.7 
While the text of Article 33 seems straightforward and has received 
little academic criticism, certain uncertainties arise in deciphering 
what Article 33 truly states, and these uncertainties can hinder 
effective implementation.8 In particular, State Parties need to know 
exactly what constitutes sufficient “fact” in the context of a 
disclosure.  
Although both UNCAC and whistleblower protection measures in 
general are relatively recent global phenomena and have therefore 
received little judicial scrutiny globally, certain countries have 
analyzed and interpreted the meaning of “fact” or “information” (an 
equivalent concept) in this context.9 Despite some overlapping 
qualities of these approaches, the variances can lead to considerable 
differences in the outcome of a case. Uncertainty about protection—
and even worse, knowledge of inadequate protection—dissuades 
potential whistleblowers whose unique access to information is so 
crucial in combating corruption and other types of wrongdoing.10 
Therefore, an effective approach must be unearthed and made clear 
so that potential whistleblowers understand and appreciate the law of 
their country, and so that countries that have not interpreted these 
issues have an example which they can then implement for 
themselves. 
This comment argues that the approach used by South Africa, the 
Reasonable Belief Approach, is the ideal approach because it 
encourages appropriate disclosures, acknowledges that 
whistleblowers might not always have concrete facts to support their 
 
 7. See id. pmbl. (acknowledging that corruption poses serious threats to the 
stability of societies); id. art. 33 (requiring state parties to consider undertaking 
measures to protect whistleblowers from unjustified treatment). 
 8. See Carr & Lewis, supra note 3, at 57 (asserting that Article 33 imposes 
requirements, such as “reasonable grounds,” which are undefined in the 
Convention and may be difficult to determine in practice). 
 9. See, e.g., Callahan et al., supra note 2, at 898–99 (explaining that all U.S. 
states require whistleblowers to “have reasonable grounds to believe that the 
information reported is accurate”). 
 10. See, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 5, at 104 (recommending implicitly that an 
effective whistleblower protection scheme in South Africa must address concerns 
regarding the complexity of the process and the law, thereby ensuring 
whistleblowers that they will have adequate protection if they disclose 
information). 
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concerns, and because it is a clear standard that removes much of the 
guesswork that plagues whistleblowing. This comment also urges 
UNCAC to specifically require Member States to implement the 
Reasonable Belief Approach and use the “disinterested observer” test 
as the means by which reasonable belief is ascertained. Finally, this 
comment notes the importance of institutions which help ensure the 
proper implementation of these standards. 
Part II of this comment introduces UNCAC and the importance of 
whistleblower protection in general, and it identifies the various 
approaches followed by certain countries that have judicially 
interpreted the meaning of “fact” in this context. Part III applies a 
typical whistleblower case to the various approaches, revealing that 
the Reasonable Belief Approach is preferred over the Specific 
Offense Approach, employed in the United Kingdom, and the 
Multiple Hurdles Approach, employed by the United States. Part IV 
recommends ways in which the best approach can be implemented so 
that Member States that currently use a different approach and ones 
that have not identified an approach can implement the Reasonable 
Belief Approach. Finally, Part V concludes by reiterating the 
importance of whistleblower protection and the best way that 
whistleblower protection can be achieved.  
II. BACKGROUND: UNCAC ARTICLE 33 AND ITS 
VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS 
Entered into force on December 14, 2005, UNCAC requires State 
Parties to implement, in accordance with the Convention, specific 
measures to facilitate the global battle against corruption.11 There are 
currently 140 signatories and 159 parties to UNCAC.12 Article 33 of 
UNCAC, “Protection of Reporting Persons,” deals specifically with 
 
 11. See UNCAC, supra note 6, art. 1 (“The purposes of this Convention are: (a) 
[t]o promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption more 
efficiently and effectively; (b) [t]o promote, facilitate and support international 
cooperation and technical assistance in the prevention of and fight against 
corruption, including in asset recovery; [and] (c) [t]o promote integrity, 
accountability and proper management of public affairs and public property.”). 
 12. See Signatories to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, U.N. 
OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ 
treaties/CAC/signatories.html (listing the signatories and parties to the Convention, 
including the dates upon which each country signed or ratified the Convention). 
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the protection of whistleblowers, stating that “[e]ach State Party shall 
consider incorporating into its domestic legal system appropriate  
measures to provide protection against any unjustified treatment for 
any person who reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the 
competent authorities any facts concerning offences established in 
accordance with this Convention.”13 While the language of Article 33 
initially seems straightforward, UNCAC does not define the terms 
contained in Article 33, thereby leaving the task of interpretation to 
individual countries.14 Some of the terms, such as the requirements of 
“good faith,” “reasonable grounds,” and “competent authorities” may 
be ambiguous, and countries have come to very different conclusions 
when interpreting what constitutes “fact,” specifically analyzing the 
sufficiency of evidence15 and the specificity of evidence contained 
within a disclosure.16 
The vast majority of countries that are Parties to UNCAC have not 
evaluated what constitutes sufficient information to qualify as 
protected disclosure.17 Nevertheless, of the countries that have 
interpreted this issue, three approaches are readily identifiable: the 
“Reasonable Belief Approach” in South Africa, the “Specific Offense 
Approach” in the United Kingdom, and the “Multiple Hurdles 
Approach” in the United States. In this section, these approaches will 
be individually discussed, and a typical whistleblower fact-pattern will 
be introduced that will contrast the approaches.  
A. THE REASONABLE BELIEF APPROACH CONSIDERS 
 
 13. UNCAC, supra note 6, art. 33. 
 14. See generally id. (omitting any elaboration that would help define any of the 
terms, such as “reasonable grounds” or “facts,” in the context of protected disclosures). 
 15. See Callahan et al., supra note 2, at 898–99 (comparing Australian, U.K., and 
U.S. approaches that evaluate the evidence required for a statement to qualify as a 
“fact”). 
 16. Compare City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr. 2009 
(2) SA 333 (A) at 30 para. 45 (S. Afr.) (stating that a reasonable belief that general 
wrongdoing is occurring is sufficient to trigger protection), with Goode v. Marks & 
Spencer, [2010] UKEAT 0442/09, [28] (U.K.) (holding that a protected disclosure 
must contain evidence that points to a specific “breach of a legal obligation”). 
 17. Cf. Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Change or the Illusion of Change: The War Against 
Official Corruption in Africa, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 697, 743–44 (2006) 
(asserting that the lack of adoption of whistleblower protection laws permits 
corruption). 
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REASONABLE BELIEF IN AN ALLEGATION A PROTECTED 
DISCLOSURE 
The Reasonable Belief Approach has been championed by, and is 
best examined through, the lens of South Africa. This approach 
simply states that a disclosure has sufficient information and rises to 
the level of protected disclosure if it is made in good faith, and with a 
“[reasonable belief] that the information disclosed and the allegations 
[therein are] substantially true.”18  
South Africa, which ratified UNCAC in 2004,19 implements 
whistleblower protection primarily through the Protected Disclosures 
Act (“PDA”) and to a lesser extent the Labour Relations Act 
(“LRA”).20 The LRA, passed in 1995 with the most recent 
amendments passed in 2002, governs the employment structure of 
South Africa.21 The LRA also provides mechanisms for dispute 
resolution.22 In 2000, South Africa enacted the PDA to 
comprehensively deal with whistleblower disclosures and 
protection.23 Specifically, the PDA protects whistleblowers from 
reprisal.24 However, whistleblowers are only protected if they make a 
 
 18. See City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality, (2) SA para. 45. 
 19. See Signatories to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 
supra note 12. 
 20. See generally Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 (S. Afr.) (creating a 
whistleblower protection scheme in South Africa); Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995 (S. Afr.) (dealing with whistleblower protection insofar as it governs 
wrongful terminations). 
 21. See generally Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (S. Afr.) (governing the 
employment structure by, among other things, regulating the organization rights of 
trade unions, promoting collective bargaining, and regulating strikes, and 
providing mechanisms for dispute resolution). 
 22. See id. pmbl. (establishing the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court 
“with exclusive jurisdiction to decide matters arising from the Act”). 
 23. See Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000, pmbl. (S. Afr.) (declaring 
that the purpose of the PDA is to “create a culture which will facilitate the 
disclosure of information by employees relating to criminal and other irregular 
conduct in the workplace in a responsible manner by providing comprehensive 
statutory guidelines for the disclosure of such information and the protection 
against any reprisals as a result of such disclosures; [and to] promote the 
eradication of criminal and other irregular conduct in organs of state and 
private bodies . . . .”). 
 24. See id. § 2(1)(a) (“The objects of this Act are . . . to protect an employee, 
whether in the private or the public sector, from being subjected to an occupational 
detriment on account of having made a protected disclosure.”). 
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disclosure as defined by the PDA.25 According to the PDA, a 
disclosure becomes protected when it is done through one of the 
specified channels.26 In the same way that UNCAC does not define 
“fact,” the PDA does not define “information,” an equivalent 
concept.27 
South Africa has litigated and therefore brought into the judicial 
sphere the opportunity to interpret the text of the PDA, particularly 
that which relates to the sufficiency of information needed to qualify 
as a protected disclosure.28 Most recently, in City of Tshwane v. 
Engineering Council of South Africa, The Supreme Court of Appeal 
held that a reasonable belief that there exists a wrongdoing (e.g. a 
breach of law or obligation) is enough to constitute information for 
the purposes of protected disclosures.29 In Tshwane, an employee 
submitted a letter claiming that incompetent people were to be 
appointed as systems operators.30 Although there were specific 
reasons for this assumption, such as test scores and internal 
communication, the disclosure was ultimately a subjective opinion 
rather than a concrete fact.31 Nevertheless, the court held that this 
 
 25. See id. § 1(i) (“‘[D]isclosure’ means any disclosure of information 
regarding any conduct of an employer, or an employee of that employer, made by  
 
 
any employee who has reason to believe that the information concerned shows or 
tends to show [at least one of a number of specified wrongdoings].”). 
 26. See id. § 1(ix) (explaining that a protected disclosure can be made to a legal 
advisor, an employer, a Cabinet or Executive Council member, the Public 
Protector, or the Auditor-General, depending on the nature of the specific 
disclosure). 
 27. See generally id. (omitting any definition of “information”). 
 28. See City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr. 2009 
(2) SA 333 (A) at 27–28 para. 41 (S. Afr.) (discussing the relationship between 
opinion and information); Comm. Workers Union v. Mobile Tel. Networks 2003 
(ZALC), para. 21, http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALC/2003/59.html (S. Afr.) 
(indicating that “genuine concerns and suspicions” should be protected, but not 
“rumors and conjecture”); see also MARTIN, supra note 5, at 45 (quoting Vumba 
Intertrade CC v. Geometric Intertrade CC 2001 (2) SA 1068 (W) (S. Afr.) 
(asserting that blind belief is not sufficient to trigger protection). 
 29. See City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality, (2) SA para. 45 (holding that the 
defendant’s reasonable belief that electrical system operator candidates were 
incompetent was sufficient to constitute a protected disclosure). 
 30. See id. para. 2. 
 31. See id. paras. 14–19 (discussing that the only concrete evidence that 
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allegation qualified as a protected disclosure.32 Indeed, the court 
specifically refused to adopt a “narrow and parsimonious 
construction of the word [information]” because it would be 
“inconsistent with the broad purposes of the Act.”33 Tshwane 
reiterated the same standard as that found in Vumba Intertrade v. 
Geometric Intertrade, which laid out the original “reasonable belief” 
standard and also effectively established a lower threshold for 
interpreting whether a disclosure contains information.34 South 
Africa has continued that reasonable belief approach in Tshwane.35 
B. THE SPECIFIC OFFENSE APPROACH REQUIRES REASONABLE 
BELIEF AND MUST POINT TO A SPECIFIC BREACH OF LAW 
The Specific Offense Approach is the model used by the United 
Kingdom.36 This approach, similar to South Africa’s Reasonable 
Belief Approach, requires good faith and reasonable belief in an 
assertion, but it also requires any assertion or allegation to have 
concrete facts that indicate that a specific breach of obligation or 
criminal activity is likely to occur.37 
The United Kingdom, which ratified UNCAC in 2006,38 governs 
whistleblower protection through the Public Interest Disclosure Act 
(“PIDA”) and, to a lesser extent, the Employment Rights Act 
 
supported the allegations were the candidates’ test scores and the responses to the 
claimant’s emails, which dismissed his concerns). 
 32. See id. para. 41 (stating that because the allegation constituted 
“information,” since it mentioned the claimant’s concerns about the possible 
incompetency of the candidates, it was a protected disclosure). 
 33. Id. para. 42. 
 34. See MARTIN, supra note 5, at 45 (quoting Vumba Intertrade CC, (2) SA) 
(“The reason to believe must be constituted by facts giving rise to such belief and a 
blind belief, or a belief based on such information or hearsay evidence as a 
reasonable man ought or could not give credence to, does not suffice.”). 
 35. See City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr. 2009 
(2) SA 333 (A) at 30 para. 45 (S. Afr.) (requiring reasonable belief, good faith, and 
a lack of an ulterior motive to render a communication into a protected disclosure). 
 36. Cf. Goode v. Marks & Spencer, [2010] UKEAT 0442/09, [36]-[38] (U.K.) 
(implementing an approach that requires a protected disclosure to specifically point 
to a “[failure] to comply with [a] legal obligation”). 
 37. See id. para. 28 (agreeing with the Employment Tribunal that the disclosed 
information must indicate that there is a breach of legal obligation). 
 38. See Signatories to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 
supra note 12. 
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(“ERA”).39 The ERA was passed in 1996 and governs employment 
relations and rights in the U.K, including unfair dismissal.40 In 1998, 
the United Kingdom enacted PIDA, incorporating it into revisions of 
the ERA, to specifically protect whistleblowers from reprisal by their 
employers.41 To be considered a whistleblower, however, the 
discloser must make a qualifying disclosure as defined by PIDA.42 
As with the PDA in South Africa, PIDA does not define 
“information.”43  
Interpreting what “information” and “reasonable belief” truly 
entail has been the task of the judiciary.44 Most recently, the United 
Kingdom has examined the notion of what qualifies as a protected 
disclosure in Goode v. Marks & Spencer.45 In Goode, an employee 
who had serious concerns regarding a redundancy scheme that was to 
be instituted by the employer voiced those concerns.46 The court held 
that this disclosure did not rise to the level of a protected disclosure, 
reasoning that a mere statement of how the employee felt does not 
qualify as information.47 With this holding, the Employment Appeals 
 
 39. See Public Interest Disclosure Act, 1998, c. 23 (U.K.) (creating a 
whistleblower protection scheme in the United Kingdom) [hereinafter PIDA]; 
Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18 (U.K.) (dealing with whistleblower protection 
by incorporating PIDA and by governing wrongful terminations). 
 40. See Employment Rights Act, c. 18, §§ 94, 108, 110 (stating that employees 
have the right to not be unfairly dismissed by their employers, and establishing that 
grievances regarding unfair dismissal can be brought before an independent 
employment tribunal). 
 41. See PIDA, supra note 39 (noting that “Part IVA: Protected Disclosures” 
from PIDA is incorporated into the ERA and therefore any discussion of 
whistleblower protection in the United Kingdom necessarily involves the ERA as 
well as PIDA). 
 42. See id. § 43B(1) (“[A] ‘qualifying disclosure’ means any disclosure of 
information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, 
tends to show one or more of the [listed offenses] . . . .”). 
 43. See generally id. (omitting any definition of “information”). 
 44. See, e.g., Cavendish Munro Prof’l Risks Mgmt. v. Geduld, [2009] 
UKEAT/0195/09/DM, [15] (U.K.) (explaining that “information” does not include 
the raising of concerns, issues, or objections). 
 45. [2010] UKEAT 0442/09, [28] (U.K.). 
 46. See id. paras. 16–18, 20 (recounting how the claimant sent an internal email 
as well as an email to the Times voicing his disgust and disappointment in the 
proposed changes). 
 47. See id. paras. 36–37 (ruling that the employee’s concerns were simply an 
assertion of his position, and that his allegations included no information relating 
to the company’s breach of any legal obligation). 
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Tribunal indicated that any qualifying disclosure must specifically 
point to the underlying breach of a law or obligation, which in this 
case could not have occurred given that “[t]he redundancy scheme 
was discretionary.”48 
The Goode decision was based on the standard recognized in 
Cavendish Munro v. Geduld.49 Similarly to Goode, an employee was 
dismissed after raising concerns internally regarding employment 
practices that subjected him to unfair prejudice.50 The Employment 
Tribunal agreed that this was a protected disclosure on the basis that 
the assertions indicated the possibility of unfair prejudice,51 but upon 
appeal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal reversed on the same 
grounds that were later adopted in Goode.52 
The standard based on these two cases narrow the interpretation of 
what constitutes “information” as laid down through a string of cases 
in the 2000s.53 In Babula v. Waltham College, an American teaching 
in the United Kingdom heard from students that their former teacher 
was creating religious friction and hoped for a repeat of the 
September 11 disaster in London.54 No action was taken by superiors 
after concerns were reported internally,55 so he made an external 
 
 48. See id. para. 29. 
 49. See Cavendish Munro Prof’l Risks Mgmt., UKEAT/0195/09/DM, [20] 
(Acknowledging that the there is a distinction between "information" and 
"allegation" recognized in the Employment Rights Act). 
 50. See id. para. 9 (stating that the claimant was dismissed as a result of his 
solicitors’ letter to the remaining two directors of the company). 
 51. See id. para. 10 (reasoning that the employee’s belief in the assertions was 
reasonable and well-founded). 
 52. See id. para. 26 (ruling that the claimant’s concerns were a statement of his 
position rather than a conveyance of information and were therefore not protected). 
 53. See Babula v. Waltham Forest College, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 174, [75] 
(Eng.) (declaring that protection is afforded to a disclosure based upon an 
objectively reasonable belief that the company has breached a legal obligation, 
even if the belief is ultimately wrong, or the disclosed information does not amount 
to a criminal offense); Bolton School v. Evans, [2006] UKEAT/0648/05/SM, [51] 
(U.K.) (implying that courts should err on the side of protection to encourage 
disclosures of possible breaches). 
 54. See Babula, EWCA (Civ) 174, para. 18 (discussing the former teacher’s 
positive reactions to the September 11 attacks). 
 55. See id. paras. 19–20 (remarking that a student’s concerns reported to her 
personal tutor, the head of the school, and the vice-principal, as well as the 
claimant’s reports to the former teacher’s supervisor, all went unheeded). 
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disclosure, which ultimately resulted in his resignation.56 The court 
stated that this was a protected disclosure.57 The court reasoned that 
the whistleblower should not necessarily have to be correct even in 
regards to the existence of an underlying breach.58 This ruling 
overturned a prior case, Kraus v. Penna, which, similar to Goode, 
involved concerns over a redundancy scheme.59  
Similarly to Babula, in Bolton School v. Evans, an employee 
deliberately broke into his employer’s computer system in order to 
demonstrate that information was capable of being obtained in 
breach of the Data Protection Act of 1998.60 He resigned under 
constructive dismissal after being disciplined.61 The court stated that 
although ultimately it may prove that the occurrence of a breach was 
not necessarily probable, his information is powerful and material 
pointing to that direction, and therefore his disclosure is protected.62 
The recent narrowing of this interpretation is what has given rise to 
the United Kingdom’s Specific Offense Approach. 
C. THE MULTIPLE HURDLES APPROACH REQUIRES  
 
 56. See id. paras. 20–21 (stating that the claimant’s reporting to the CIA and 
FBI resulted in his resignation). 
 57. See id. paras. 77–79 (asserting that even without hard facts to support the 
employee’s concerns, a reasonable belief that criminal activity will occur is 
sufficient). 
 58. See id. paras. 48, 51 (explaining that even if evidence ultimately 
demonstrates that a disclosure, made in good faith, was inaccurate or wrong and 
that no breach was likely, the protections for disclosure are not lost). 
 59. See Kraus v. Penna, [2003] UKEAT/0360/03/ST, [21] (U.K.) (ruling that 
the disclosure must be based on a reasonable belief that a breach of law or legal 
obligation is likely). A redundancy scheme eliminates the position of an employee, 
so termination pursuant to a redundancy scheme has nothing to do with the 
employee’s performance or misconduct. They are often used when a company 
restructures itself to become more competitive or when an employee’s 
responsibilities are redistributed among multiple coworkers. 
 60. See Bolton School v. Evans, [2006] UKEAT/0648/05/SM, [12]-[14] (U.K.) 
(explaining how the claimant broke into the computer system after the head of the 
ICT project group determined that they did not need significant security protection 
on the network). 
 61. See id. para. 22 (detailing the claimant’s contention that he was disciplined 
because of his qualifying disclosure). 
 62. See id. para. 52 (“[I]t would undermine the protection of this valuable 
legislation if employees were expected to anticipate and evaluate all potential 
defences, whether within the scope of their knowledge or not, when deciding 
whether or not to make that disclosure.”). 
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REASONABLE BELIEF, INDICATION OF A SPECIFIC BREACH OF LAW, 
DISCLOSURE OF UNKNOWN INFORMATION, AND REPORTING 
THROUGH EXTRA-EMPLOYMENT CHANNELS 
The Multiple Hurdles Approach, followed by the United States, 
requires reasonable belief that a wrongdoing is occurring.63 It also 
requires potential whistleblowers to specify the underlying conduct 
that they expect to result in unlawfulness or impropriety.64 In 
addition, the information being disclosed could not have been known 
otherwise.65 Finally, the disclosure must be made outside regular 
employment channels.66 
In the federal public sector, whistleblower protection is largely 
governed by the Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPA”).67 Although 
the U.S. whistleblower protection scheme is comprised of a 
patchwork of countless federal and state statutes,68 the WPA is the 
focus of this analysis because it is the earliest and most well-known 
statute in the United States, and because it is representative of the 
issues that permeate through the other whistleblower provisions.69 
Passed in 1989, the WPA is codified as Section 2302(b)(8) 
 
 63. See Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2006). 
 64. See Kahn v. Dep’t of Justice, 618 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(explaining that a potential whistleblower cannot assert the existence of 
unlawfulness or impropriety without specifying the underlying conduct that is 
giving rise to the unlawfulness). 
 65. See Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (defining disclosure as something that must “reveal something that was 
hidden and not known.”). 
 66. See id. at 1352-54 (explaining that a disclosure made in connection with 
assigned employment duties, such as those of a law enforcement officer, does not 
qualify as a protected disclosure). 
 67. 5 U.S.C. § 2302. 
 68. See Federal Whistleblower Protections, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWERS CENTER, 
http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?option=com_ 
content&task=view&id=816&Itemid=129 (last visited Apr. 4, 2012) (listing 
federal whistleblower protection statutes in the United States); see also Robert G. 
Vaughn, State Whistleblowers Statutes and the Future of Whistleblower 
Protection, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 581, 582 (1999) (stating that there are hundreds of 
state whistleblower protection statutes in the United States). 
 69. See Rebecca L. Dobias, Note, Amending the Whistleblower Protection Act: 
Will Federal Employees Finally Speak Without Fear?, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 117, 119 
(2003) (describing the creation of the WPA and its effects on the proliferation of 
complaints received and addressed by the office responsible for whistleblower 
protection). 
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Prohibited Personnel Practices, and as the title indicates, prohibits 
retaliation against whistleblowers.70 
Given the relatively older passage of the WPA, the judiciary has 
interpreted what is meant by “information” in the context of a 
protected disclosure.71 The most recent standard for what constitutes 
a qualifying disclosure pursuant to the WPA was articulated in Kahn 
v. Department of Justice.72 Kahn was a Special Agent Criminal 
Investigator with the DEA with the responsibility of planning and 
conducting complex criminal investigations, particularly in the field 
of drug trafficking.73 Concerned about the unauthorized use of an 
informant with a criminal history, he reported his concerns to his 
superiors.74 Ultimately, a breakdown of relations within the 
department prompted the transfer of Kahn to another field office.75 
Kahn initiated a claim for wrongful employment retaliation under the 
WPA,76 and the court ultimately held that Kahn’s reports did not 
constitute protected disclosures.77  
In its analysis, the court discussed at length the standard to be 
 
 70. See Huffman, 263 F.3d at 1347 (stating that no retaliation can be made 
against a public employee for “any disclosure of information by an employee or 
applicant which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences (i) a 
violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross 
waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public 
health or safety”). 
 71. See, e.g., Kahn v. Dep’t of Justice, 618 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(interpreting a protected disclosure as a communication that is unknown and 
pertains to the underlying conduct of an act of unlawfulness). 
 72. See id. (“[A protected disclosure is] an employee communication (1) that 
discloses unknown information, (2) that an employee would reasonably believe is 
unlawful, and (3) that is outside the scope of the employee’s normal duties or 
communicated outside of normal channels.”). 
 73. See id. at 1308. 
 74. See id. at 1308-09 (discussing how the informant’s criminal history and 
recent release from prison could disqualify him as a DEA informant). 
 75. See id. at 1309-10 (explaining how numerous meetings between Kahn and 
his superiors regarding the use of an unregistered informant led to a deterioration 
in relations). 
 76. See id. at 1310 (claiming that despite being cleared of any wrongdoing, the 
claimant was transferred due to a “character flaw,” which the claimant asserted 
was a reprisal). 
 77. See Kahn v. Dep’t of Justice, 618 F.3d 1306, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (ruling 
that the claimant’s communications were not disclosures, primarily because his 
superiors already knew of the information contained in the communication). 
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followed regarding the WPA and qualifying disclosures.78 As to the 
first element, “disclosure” is interpreted broadly to reflect WPA’s 
legislative history and intent.79 Nevertheless, a disclosure must also 
“reveal something that was hidden and not known,” and it “must 
pertain to the underlying conduct, rather than to the asserted fact of 
its unlawfulness or impropriety.”80 In other words, whistleblowers 
who report misconduct to their employers have not made a protected 
disclosure when it is the employer who knowingly engaged in the 
misconduct because the whistleblower did not “reveal something that 
was hidden and not known.”81  
Regarding the second element pertaining to reasonable belief in 
unlawfulness, the United States, unlike South Africa and the United 
Kingdom, prescribes a test to determine whether a belief is actually 
reasonable.82 This “disinterested observer” test asks whether a 
“disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known 
to and readily ascertainable by the employee [could] reasonably 
conclude that the actions of the government evidence” a violation of 
any law, rule, or regulation.83 This, however, does not mean that the 
petitioner must prove that an actual violation occurred.84 
The third and final element states that for a disclosure to be 
 
 78. See id. at 1312 (defining “protected disclosure” as any disclosure of 
unknown information which reflects a reasonable belief that unlawful conduct 
occurred). 
 79. See id. (citing Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1347-48 
(Fed. Cir. 2001)) (describing how Congress altered the statutory language from the 
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 to ensure a wide range of disclosures fell within 
the protection of the WPA). 
 80. Id. (quoting Huffman, 263 F.3d at 1350, 1350 n.2). 
 81. See Huffman, 263 F.3d at 1350 (“When an employee reports or states that 
there has been misconduct by a wrongdoer to the wrongdoer, the employee is not 
making a ‘disclosure’ of misconduct. If the misconduct occurred, the wrongdoer 
necessarily knew of the conduct already because he is the one engaged in the 
misconduct.”). 
 82. See LaChance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (prescribing 
the “disinterested observer” test as the appropriate means by which to ascertain 
reasonable belief). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Drake v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 543 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(clarifying that the test is not whether the petitioner was able to prove a violation, 
“but rather could a disinterested observer . . . reasonably conclude that . . . a 
violation did occur”). 
  
940 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [27:4 
 
protected, an employee must communicate the information outside 
the scope of employment: either outside the scope of regular 
employment duties or outside of regular employment channels.85 
Applying the black letter law of the WPA, the court in Kahn found 
that because Kahn’s communication was within the scope of his 
regular duties and made through regular employment channels, it 
was not a protected disclosure.86 
D. A TYPICAL WHISTLEBLOWER CASE 
Given the different approaches and the varying standards through 
which countries have interpreted “facts” in the whistleblowing 
context, a sample fact-pattern can highlight the differences of those 
approaches and the effects that those approaches have on the 
outcome of certain cases. A useful lens of analysis is a fact-pattern 
resembling the facts in Tshwane.87 
This typical whistleblower case (“Typical Case”) assumes the 
following facts: An employee (“Employee”) is an electrical engineer 
whose responsibility as Managing Engineer at a public power system 
control center is to ensure that electrical power reaches the 
community safely and continuously. The Employee writes a letter to 
his superior, the Strategic Executive Officer of the Electricity 
Department, expressing concerns about the method in which new 
system operators are hired.88 Specifically, the Employee is concerned 
 
 85. See Huffman, 263 F.3d at 1352-54 (outlining three categories of employee 
communication, of which the latter two qualify as protected disclosures: (1) 
disclosures as part of normal duties made through normal channels, (2) disclosures 
as part of normal duties made outside normal channels, and (3) disclosures made 
outside normal or assigned duties). 
 86. See Kahn v. Dep’t of Justice, 618 F.3d 1306, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(finding that (1) as “lead agent,” Kahn’s responsibilities included determining what 
was proper procedure and therefore his communication was within the scope of his 
normal duties; and (2) reporting his concerns to his superiors were made through 
regular channels). 
 87. See City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr. 2009 
(2) SA 333 (A) at 2-7 paras. 1-10 (S. Afr.) (presenting the facts of the case, which 
are similar to other whistleblower cases and raise issues that are pervasive 
throughout whistleblowing jurisprudence). 
 88. Cf. id. ¶ 2 (noting that this letter was also copied to the General Manager of 
Electricity Development and Energy Business, the Municipal Manager, the 
Department of Labour, and the Engineering Council). 
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that due to the important and potentially dangerous nature of the 
work, only highly-skilled engineers are qualified to fill a current 
shortage of workers.89 The Employee is given permission to recruit 
such system operators and prepares a test to short-list the applicants. 
The applicants fare poorly, but nevertheless the highest scoring 
applicants are shortlisted. The Employee’s supervisor deems the 
shortlisted candidates unacceptable because they are all white.90 The 
Employee stresses the importance of hiring the most qualified 
candidates, but the supervisor only shortlists diverse candidates, none 
of whom are white. For these reasons, the Employee circulates the 
letter voicing his concerns. As a result, employment relations break 
down, the Employee is suspended, and disciplinary proceedings are 
initiated. Due to the belief that the letter is a protected disclosure, the 
Employee brings suit. 
III.ANALYSIS: IS THERE AN IDEAL APPROACH?  
The Typical Case, modeled closely after the fact-pattern in 
Tshwane, highlights how the outcome of a case varies depending on 
which approach is used, thereby revealing the importance of an ideal 
approach. Additionally, the Typical Case is precisely a case where a 
potential whistleblower does not have all the information proving 
that wrongful conduct is occurring, yet the information that is present 
raises significant suspicion.91 Given this incomplete puzzle, applying 
the facts of the Typical Case to the different approaches answers 
whether a potential whistleblower is protected, and whether that 
potential whistleblower is encouraged or discouraged to disclose. 
When the Typical Case is applied to the Reasonable Belief 
 
 89. Cf. id. ¶ 4 (noting that these engineers are responsible for working with 
high-voltage systems and ensuring safe and continuous power to the community). 
 90. Cf. id. ¶ 11 (observing the diversity hiring goals of South Africa’s 
Employment Equity Act, but indicating that diversity candidates underperformed 
even when 10 percent was added to their scores). 
 91. See, e.g., id. ¶ 41 (discussing that the claimant’s disclosure letter “contained 
information concerning the possible lack of competence of those who were likely 
to be appointed to the system operator posts”) (emphasis added); accord Babula v. 
Waltham Forest College, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 174, [80] (Eng.) (stressing that 
typical employees do not have a sufficient understanding of criminal law to allow 
them to determine whether specific wrongdoing is occurring, or the evidence they 
have is sufficient to prove a criminal offense). 
  
942 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [27:4 
 
Approach, it shows how this approach offers a clear standard for 
potential whistleblowers, encourages them to disclose appropriate 
concerns, and best advances the purpose of UNCAC. In contrast, the 
Specific Offense Approach falls slightly short of that ideal because it 
restricts protection by requiring disclosures to point to a specific, 
underlying offense. Finally, the Multiple Hurdles Approach creates 
even more obstacles for protection and also upsets employer-
employee relations.  
A. THE REASONABLE BELIEF APPROACH BEST ADVANCES THE 
PURPOSE OF UNCAC AND OFFERS A CLEAR STANDARD FOR 
WHISTLEBLOWERS 
Applying the Typical Case to the Reasonable Belief Approach 
yields an outcome that facilitates appropriate disclosures by erring on 
the side of protection and establishing a relatively simple standard 
that potential whistleblowers can understand.92 By encouraging 
disclosures through protection, the Reasonable Belief Approach also 
advances the purpose of UNCAC.93 
The standard set forth in South Africa is a simple and convenient 
standard that, with few other elements, examines whistleblowers’ 
reasonable belief in their allegations.94 Iterated in Tshwane and 
Vumba, as long as the whistleblower has a good faith and a 
reasonable belief that a wrongdoing is occurring, even if it is a 
subjective belief, the information disclosed qualifies as a protected 
disclosure, thereby prohibiting reprisal.95 Nevertheless, the 
Reasonable Belief Approach does not give free reign to 
whistleblowers because it sets a lower parameter demarcating what is 
 
 92. See Bolton School v. Evans, [2006] UKEAT/0648/05/SM, [51]-[52] (U.K.) 
(favoring an interpretation that extends protection for disclosures that have 
“potentially powerful and material evidence” that could help uncover wrongdoing). 
 93. See UNCAC, supra note 6, pmbl. (acknowledging that corruption can be 
prevented and eradicated only through the involvement and cooperation of the 
public sector, such as civil society and non-governmental organizations). 
 94. See City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr. 2009 
(2) SA 333 (A) at 30 para. 45 (S. Afr.) (listing additional but non-onerous 
requirements to protect a disclosure, namely that the whistleblower acted in good 
faith, with reasonable belief, and without a motive of personal gain). 
 95. See id. (stating that “[i]t would be surprising” if a disclosure was not 
protected where a whistleblower acted in good faith, “at considerable personal cost 
and not for personal gain”). 
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reasonable belief from what is unreasonable belief.96 
The Typical Case, drawn largely from the facts in Tshwane, 
illuminates how this approach facilitates appropriate disclosures. As 
in many typical whistleblower cases, all of the information necessary 
to prove a violation is not available to the discloser; indeed, logically 
speaking, if all the information was readily available, there would be 
little contention as to what would qualify as a protected disclosure. In 
the Typical Case and Tshwane, the disclosure involves an employee 
who, given his communication with supervisors and information 
relating to hiring patterns, raised his concerns that public safety was 
being compromised.97 Understandably, societies have an interest in 
ensuring that public safety concerns are disclosed. This can 
effectively be done by protecting such disclosures, and 
whistleblower protection measures, such as UNCAC and South 
Africa’s PDA, have been created for that very purpose.98 Therefore, 
despite not having concrete evidence that a specific breach was 
occurring, the Employee in the Typical Case would be protected and 
potential public safety concerns would be addressed. With a higher 
standard, however, potential whistleblowers might question whether 
their disclosure would be protected and may opt to remain silent 
because that way, at the very least, they can be certain that they will 
not face reprisal from employers.99 
B. THE SPECIFIC OFFENSE APPROACH RAISES THE BAR FOR 
PROTECTION BY UNFAIRLY REQUIRING DISCLOSURES TO POINT TO 
 
 96. See MARTIN, supra note 5, at 45 (quoting Vumba Intertrade CC v. 
Geometric Intertrade CC 2009 (2) SA 1068 (W) at para. 50 (S. Afr.)) (noting that 
“blind belief” is insufficient). 
 97. See City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality, (2) SA, ¶¶ 2, 4 (discussing the 
claimant’s concerns regarding questionable hiring practices and the related effects 
on public safety). 
 98. See MARTIN, supra note 5, at 45 (quoting Vumba Intertrade CC, (2) SA) 
(stating that the PDA seeks to establish a culture of whistleblowing); see also 
UNCAC, supra note 6, pmbl., art. 33 (highlighting the serious threats posed by 
corruption to nearly all aspects of society and establishing Article 33 as a means to 
combat corruption through whistleblower protection). 
 99. Cf. David Lewis, The Council of Europe Resolution and Recommendation 
on the Protection of Whistleblowers, 39 INDUS. L. J. 432, 433 (2010) (“One 
consequence of this is that some people may choose not to report serious 
wrongdoing for fear that they may subsequently be deemed to have had an 
inappropriate objective.”). 
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A SPECIFIC OFFENSE  
The Specific Offense Approach, employed by the United 
Kingdom, raises the bar for what qualifies as sufficient fact to trigger 
protection from reprisal.100 Applying the Typical Case to the Specific 
Offense Approach shows why this approach potentially discourages 
appropriate disclosures because (a) it is more likely that a disclosed 
suspicion will be treated as an allegation rather than a disclosure of 
information, and (b) it effectively requires a potential whistleblower 
to have a much more acute understanding of which underlying 
offenses are being committed.101  
On the first front, the Specific Offense Approach increases the 
likelihood that a disclosure will be placed in the “allegation” 
category rather than the “information” category, which will render it 
unprotected.102 As Goode and Cavendish Munro hold, a qualifying 
disclosure must point to the underlying breach of a law or 
obligation.103 
Similarly, on the second front, the Specific Offense Approach 
requires the whistleblower to have a much more acute understanding 
of the law.104 This second front works in tandem with the first 
because if the whistleblower does not point to a specific underlying 
offense, the disclosure will likely be treated as an allegation and not 
as information.105 Applying the Typical Case to the U.K. case law 
illustrates how these two fronts work together to discourage 
 
 100. See, e.g., Cavendish Munro Prof’l Risks Mgmt. v. Geduld, [2009] 
UKEAT/0195/09/DM, [15] (U.K.) (“Simply voicing a concern, raising an issue or 
setting out an objection is not the same as disclosing information.”). 
 101. See id. ¶¶ 20, 24-26 (distinguishing “information” and “an allegation” and 
establishing that information must convey facts); see also, e.g., Goode v. Marks & 
Spencer, [2010] UKEAT 0442/09, [37] (U.K.) (requiring that a whistleblower, in a 
disclosure, must specifically point to the underlying offense being committed). 
 102. See Cavendish Munro Prof’l Risks Mgmt., UKEAT 0195/09/DM, [24] 
(declaring that a disclosure must contain information and that the ordinary 
meaning of “information” is to convey facts, otherwise, the disclosure is merely an 
allegation). 
 103. See Goode, UKEAT 0442/09, [56] (supporting the Tribunal’s findings that 
the employee’s statement regarding concerns about a redundancy scheme 
demonstrated no reasonable belief related to the breach of any law). 
 104. Cf. id. ¶¶ 27-28 (requiring the whistleblower to point to the underlying 
offense being committed, which necessitates an understanding of the law). 
 105. Cf. Cavendish Munro Prof’l Risks Mgmt., UKEAT 0195/09/DM, [24]. 
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appropriate disclosures.  
If the Typical Case is applied to the standard set forth by 
Cavendish Munro and reaffirmed in Goode, the outcome would not 
be in the Employee’s favor.106 First and foremost, the Employee’s 
communication (i.e. the letter) does not point to an underlying breach 
of a law or obligation.107 Indeed, the employer in Tshwane 
considered diversity goals under the Employment Equity Act, 
balancing several goals, one of which is competence.108 Moreover, 
the Employee’s own test adds 10% to the scores of diverse 
candidates.109 Hence, the Employee never points to a specific breach 
of law or obligation.110 Rather, he simply raises concerns, balancing 
the need to advance employment equity with safety concerns.111 
These concerns, interpreted by Goode and Cavendish Munro, would 
be more akin to an allegation rather than to a disclosure of 
information, thereby precluding it from being a protected 
disclosure.112 
As discussed above, the current standard that is derived from 
Goode and Cavendish Munro narrows the interpretation of what 
constitutes fact and information.113 Indeed, in Babula and Evans, the 
courts followed an approach that more closely resembles the South 
African Reasonable Belief Approach.114 The courts used specific 
 
 106. Cf. Goode, UKEAT 0442_09_1504, [¶ 56] (requiring that a protected 
disclosure point to a breach of a legal obligation). 
 107. Cf. City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr. 2009 
(2) SA 333 (SCA) ¶¶ 27-28 (S. Afr.) (raising safety concerns stemming from the 
questionable hiring practices without pointing to the breach of a specific law). 
 108. See id. ¶ 11 (reflecting the discretionary nature of filling employee 
positions based on balancing competency with diversity). 
 109. See id. (indicating that the employee was aware of the Employment Equity 
Act’s goals of filling positions with diverse candidates). 
 110. Cf. id. ¶ 28 (pointing to a mere concern regarding a discretionary practice 
rather than to an allegation that a specific breach of law occurred). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Cavendish Munro Prof’l Risks Mgmt. v. Geduld, [2009] 
UKEAT/0195/09/DM, [20], [25] (U.K.) (stating that an allegation does not amount 
to information and therefore does not qualify as a protected disclosure). 
 113. Compare id. (stating that an allegation does not qualify as a protected 
disclosure), with Babula v. Waltham Forest College, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 174, [51] 
(U.K.) (stating that a disclosure should be encouraged, in some cases, even if it 
cannot point to the breach of a specific law or obligation). 
 114. See Babula, EWCA (Civ) 174, [81] (placing the emphasis of analysis on 
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language to stress the importance of reasonable concerns and the 
necessity to encourage such disclosures.115 The court in Babula, for 
example, found that a protected disclosure did exist despite the 
claimant’s inability to point to a specific violation.116 Evans stressed 
the importance of encouraging disclosures even if it turns out that it 
was not probable that a wrongdoing was occurring.117 Of course, 
such disclosures are best encouraged by ensuring that they will be 
classified as protected disclosures and ensuring that the discloser will 
be protected from reprisal.118 Unfortunately, the recent and 
controlling cases that define the Specific Offense Approach have 
raised the standard and hence no longer encourage these types of 
disclosures.119 
C. THE MULTIPLE HURDLES APPROACH CREATES ADDITIONAL 
ELEMENTS THAT OBFUSCATE THE LAW AND UPSET EMPLOYER-
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 
The Multiple Hurdles Approach employed by the United States is 
 
reasonable belief and good faith); Bolton School v. Evans, [2006] 
UKEAT/0648/05/SM, [42] (U.K.) (noting that the applicable section of the 
Employment Rights Act 1996 requires an employee’s reasonable belief that there 
may be a failure to comply with a legal obligation); see also City of Tshwane 
Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr. 2009 (2) SA 333 (A) at 30 para. 45 
(S. Afr.) (placing the emphasis of analysis on reasonable belief, good faith, and the 
absence of a motive of personal gain). 
 115. See Babula, EWCA (Civ) 174, [51] (discussing the materially important 
information that can be uncovered as a result of encouraging such disclosures). 
 116. See id. ¶¶ 74-75 (indicating that a reasonable person could still believe that 
wrongdoing is occurring despite not being able to point to a breach of a specific 
law or obligation). 
 117. See Evans, UKEAT 0648/05/SM, [51] (declaring that the rationale for 
protecting these types of disclosures is to encourage disclosure of potentially 
powerful material that could point to a wrongdoing). 
 118. See generally Marie Chêne, Good Practice in Whistleblowing Protection 
Legislation (WPL), U4 ANTI-CORRUPTION RESOURCE CENTER (July 1, 2009), 
http://www.u4.no/publications/good-practice-in-whistleblowing-protection-
legislation-wpl/ (reviewing best practices regarding whistleblowing protection 
legislation, including the objectives and scope of such legislation, and various 
types of disclosures, such as “good faith” and public disclosures). 
 119. See, e.g., Cavendish Munro Prof’l Risks Mgmt. v. Geduld, [2009] 
UKEAT/0195/09/DM, [20] (U.K.) (raising the bar of what constitutes protected 
disclosures by categorizing many reported concerns as allegations rather than 
information). 
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the strictest approach when it comes to interpreting what constitutes 
sufficient fact to qualify as a protected disclosure. This model 
involves several elements that effectively amount to obstacles which 
a communication must overcome to render it a protected 
disclosure.120 Applying the Typical Case to these elements reveals 
the inherent complications with the Multiple Hurdles Approach and 
why this approach effectively discourages appropriate disclosures. 
The first step in the Multiple Hurdles Approach, the requirement 
that the information be a disclosure, means that it must be unknown 
to the recipient of the communication and it must pertain to the 
underlying conduct.121 This is a cumbersome obstacle because 
whistleblowing is most useful in exactly those instances where a 
wrongdoer knows of and therefore consciously decides to continue 
the wrongdoing. In the Typical Case, the Employee’s internal 
communication would not qualify as a protected disclosure because 
his superior already knew of his own conduct.122 An approach that 
requires a lack of knowledge amounts to greater protection for a 
culpable employer and less protection for a genuine whistleblower.123  
In the Typical Case, the Employee could make external 
communications (i.e., the letters to the Department of Labour and to 
the Engineering Council) as a way to overcome this obstacle of 
knowledge because external authorities are unaware of internal 
operations.124 Even though a potential whistleblower under the 
 
 120. See Kahn v. Dep’t of Justice, 618 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(requiring that the information be a disclosure, based on a reasonable belief, and 
communicated outside the scope of regular employment duties or regular 
employment channels). 
 121. See id. (stating that if the recipient of the communication already knew of 
his conduct, the communication was known and it automatically does not qualify 
as a protected disclosure). 
 122. Cf. City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr. 2009 
(2) SA 333 (A) at 31 para. 47 (S. Afr.) (providing an example of where a claimant 
communicated concerns to his superiors when the superior already knew of the 
conduct and continued with the questionable hiring process). 
 123. See id. (“Such a construction would undermine the whole purpose of the 
PDA because it has the result that the more culpable the employer in the conduct 
giving rise to the report and the greater its knowledge of wrongdoing, the less 
would be the protection enjoyed by the employee.”). 
 124. See id. ¶ 2 (stating that the claimant disclosed the concerns externally after 
the internal communications went unaddressed). 
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Multiple Hurdles Approach might be able to overcome such 
obstacles by making external disclosures, such preference for 
external disclosures runs counter to the purposes of an effective 
whistleblower protection scheme.125 Additionally, one of the main 
concerns of giving too much leeway to whistleblower rights is that 
employers desire loyalty from their employees and expect a certain 
degree of confidentiality in their business processes.126 By 
encouraging whistleblowers to disclose information externally, the 
rights of employers will often be breached.127 Indeed, in Tshwane, 
one of the main points of contention was that an external disclosure 
was made, which is contrary to the loyalty expected from 
employees.128 Thus an effective whistleblower protection scheme 
should encourage internal disclosures before external disclosures.129 
Hence, the requirement of lack of knowledge is the opposite of the 
type of model that should be advanced.130 
The second aspect of the first element is that a disclosure must 
pertain to the underlying conduct rather than to the assertion that a 
wrongdoing has occurred.131 This resembles the United Kingdom’s 
 
 125. See Callahan et al., supra note 2, at 905 (underscoring some of the 
advantages of internal disclosures, including lower organizational costs). But see 
id. at 891 (suggesting that in the United States, external reporting is preferred 
because priority is placed on exposure over confidentiality). 
 126. See id. at 890-91 (discussing the United Kingdom 1996 Employment 
Rights Act’s emphasis on internal whistleblowing stemming from a duty of 
confidentiality to one’s employer). 
 127. See id. at 905 (suggesting that internal disclosures allow for the “correction 
of misunderstandings, reducing the likelihood that [an employer] will unfairly 
suffer harm due to external exposure”). 
 128. See City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr. 2009 
(2) SA 333 (A) at 19 para. 29 (S. Afr.) (summarizing the employer’s letter to the 
claimant stating that making external disclosures “calls for strong disciplinary 
measures” lest it become a recurring event that would undermine employment 
relations). 
 129. See Chêne, supra note 118, at 5 (positing that the best practice is to prefer 
internal reporting over external reporting, as long as internal reporting mechanisms 
exist). 
 130. Cf. H. Vincent McKnight et al., Cause of Action by Employee for 
Retaliation and Reprisal Pursuant to the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(h), 
22 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 217 § 32 (2003) (highlighting the difficulties of proving 
knowledge through direct evidence). 
 131. See Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1350 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (“[T]he disclosure must pertain to the underlying conduct, rather than to the 
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Specific Offense Approach in its delineation between allegations and 
information.132 As Babula and Evans considered, serious and 
warranted concerns should be encouraged because a typical 
employee cannot be expected to know or understand the specific law 
being breached or the specific facts that give rise to that breach.133 
Taken one step forward, it is unreasonable to expect that typical 
employees will have the required knowledge of the law to support 
their concerns or to expect those employees to conduct legal research 
to assure themselves that they will be protected.134 Such expectations 
add to uncertainty and thereby discourage potential whistleblowers 
from communicating reasonable concerns.135 
The second element, reasonable belief that the assertions in a 
disclosure are true, resembles the requirements found in all of the 
approaches.136 Understandably, without a requirement for reasonable 
belief, frivolous disclosures cannot be prevented.137 The way in 
 
asserted fact of its unlawfulness or impropriety, in order for the disclosure to be 
protected by the WPA.”). 
 132. See Cavendish Munro Prof’l Risks Mgmt. v. Geduld, [2009] 
UKEAT/0195/09/DM, [20], [26] (U.K.) (explaining that an allegation does not 
constitute information and therefore does not qualify as a protected disclosure). 
 133. See, e.g., Babula v. Waltham Forest College, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 174, [80] 
(Eng.) (“To expect employees on the factory floor or in shops and offices to have a 
detailed knowledge of the criminal law sufficient to enable them to determine 
whether or not particular facts which they reasonably believe to be true are 
capable, as a matter of law, of constituting a particular criminal offence seems . . . 
unrealistic . . . .”). 
 134. See, e.g., Kratzer v. Welsh Companies, 771 N.W.2d 14, 26 (Minn. 2009) 
(Meyer, J., dissenting) (pointing to the unfairness in expecting potential 
whistleblowers to “have enough knowledge of the law to know if a set of alleged 
facts would, if proven, be a violation as a matter of law”). 
 135. See MINISTER OF STATE SERVICES, REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE 
PROTECTED DISCLOSURES ACT 2000: REPORT TO THE MINISTER OF STATE 
SERVICES ¶ 6.2 (2003), available at 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/Documents/Files/ACFF62C.pdf (noting that without 
effective whistleblower protection, potential whistleblowers are deterred from 
making disclosures of wrongdoing for fear of suffering personally). 
 136. See, e.g., City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr. 
2009 (2) SA 333 (A) at 30 para. 45 (S. Afr.) (requiring reasonable belief that 
allegations contained in a disclosure are “substantially true”); accord UNCAC, 
supra note 6, art. 33 (requiring reasonable grounds and good faith to trigger 
protection for a disclosure). 
 137. See Chêne, supra note 118, at 4 (asserting that the whistleblower’s motive 
should not be the focus of the inquiry and observing that requiring disclosures 
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which this second element differs from the similar requirement found 
in the Reasonable Belief and Specific Offense Approaches is that the 
reasonable belief element is clearly defined, and an easily-
administered test (the disinterested observer test) is set forth.138 
Giving potential whistleblowers a clear standard removes the risk of 
them having to guess as to whether their disclosures will be 
protected.139  
Finally, the third element, the requirement that the communication 
be made outside the scope of regular employment duties or regular 
employment channels, is an onerous obstacle that hinders the 
implementation of an effective whistleblower scheme.140 In the 
Typical Case, the letter written to the Employee’s superior would not 
qualify as a protected disclosure because it was communicated 
within the scope of his duties as a recruiter of the candidates, and it 
was communicated within regular employment channels via an email 
to his superior. To the contrary, letters to the Department of Labour 
and the Engineering Council would constitute communication 
outside regular employment channels. While these external 
communications would qualify as protected disclosures under the 
Multiple Hurdles Approach, it makes little sense to encourage 
external disclosures rather than internal disclosures.141  
Given the above analysis, two of the three elements of the 
Multiple Hurdles Approach, the requirement that the information is 
unknown and the requirement that the disclosure be made outside the 
scope or channels of regular employment, encourage external 
 
“based on ‘an honest belief on reasonable grounds’” may have the effect of 
wrongly focusing on the whistleblower’s motives rather than on the alleged 
misconduct). 
 138. See LaChance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[A] 
disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily 
ascertainable by the employee [would] reasonably conclude that the actions of the 
government evidence [the violation of an applicable law, rule, or regulation]"). 
 139. See MINISTER OF STATE SERVICES, supra note 135, ¶¶ 5.3, 8.18 
(recommending that an effective whistleblower protection scheme should create 
clear mechanisms to remove uncertainty that could discourage potential 
whistleblowers). 
 140. See Chêne, supra note 118, at 5 (promoting internal disclosures as the first 
outlet prior to resorting to external disclosures). 
 141. See Callahan et al., supra note 2, at 905 (highlighting the benefits of 
internal disclosures, including reduced organizational costs). 
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disclosures over internal disclosures and hence upset employer-
employee relations.142 On the other hand, the second element, 
“reasonableness,” runs through each approach, is clearly defined, and 
has an implementable test; therefore, it serves less as an obstacle and 
more as an illumination of the law.143  
IV.RECOMMENDATIONS 
Applying the Typical Case to the various approaches sheds light 
on a useful perspective that ultimately identifies ways to improve 
whistleblower protection schemes in UNCAC countries. The 
recommendations come in three categories: First, the South African 
Reasonable Belief Approach is the best model and should be 
advanced both in countries that follow a different approach and in 
states that have not interpreted what constitutes “fact,” or 
equivalently, “information.” Second, in order to make the standard 
clear and easy to follow, UNCAC should clarify the appropriate 
elements and designate an appropriate test for evaluating reasonable 
belief to remove the guesswork surrounding what constitutes 
sufficient information. Finally, institutions should be established in 
UNCAC countries so that they can monitor and facilitate 
whistleblower protection claims. 
A. THE REASONABLE BELIEF APPROACH SHOULD BE ADVANCED 
IN ALL STATE PARTIES  
The Reasonable Belief Approach is preferable over the other 
approaches for several reasons. First, it advances the purpose of 
UNCAC and whistleblower protection in general because it 
facilitates reasonable disclosures that could uncover corrupt activities 
and other forms of wrongdoing.144 It does so by creating a clear and 
intuitive standard which simply requires reasonable belief that a 
 
 142. See id. (suggesting that internal disclosures allow misunderstandings to be 
corrected, lessening the risk that an employer unfairly be subject to harm from an 
external disclosure). 
 143. See Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 
2010) (indicating that well-defined standards offer clarity and predictability). 
 144. See UNCAC, supra note 6, pmbl. (acknowledging that involvement of 
individuals and the civil society as a whole is crucial to combating corruption). 
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violation is occurring or may occur.145 It also does not put the 
investigatory burden on the whistleblower.146 Moreover, the 
Reasonable Belief Approach is preferable for employers as well 
because by protecting whistleblowers that make internal disclosures, 
it naturally encourages internal disclosures over external disclosures. 
This way, the Reasonable Belief Approach gives credence to the 
expectations of employee loyalty, and keeps confidential and 
sensitive information from the public.147 Unlike the Multiple Hurdles 
Approach’s requirement of using extra-employment channels, it 
allows a disclosure to be handled internally and smoothly.148 
The United Nations, via the Conference of the State Parties to the 
UNCAC, should designate the Reasonable Belief Approach as the 
best practice in whistleblower cases.149 It should also specify that the 
approach should be implemented without including additional 
hurdles such as those found in the Specific Offense Approach and 
the Multiple Hurdles Approach. By recommending the Reasonable 
Belief Approach, State Parties that follow a different approach or 
those that have not interpreted the issue of “fact” can immediately 
follow the Reasonable Belief Approach, enabling the residents of 
these countries to better understand both the process and that their 
governments and the international community encourage appropriate 
 
 145. See Lewis, supra note 99, at 433 (“[S]ome people may choose not to report 
serious wrongdoing for fear that they may subsequently be deemed to have had an 
inappropriate objective.”). 
 146. Cf. Kratzer v. Welsh Companies, 771 N.W.2d 14, 26 (Minn. 2009) (Meyer, 
J., dissenting) (recognizing that if the “developing trend” towards narrow 
construction of “violation or suspected violation” continues, employees suspecting 
wrongdoing who are incorrect in their understanding of the law will lose protection 
afforded by the whistleblower statute). 
 147. See Jenny Mendelsohn, Calling the Boss or Calling the Press: A 
Comparison of British and American Responses to Internal and External 
Whistleblowing, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 723, 741 (2009) (quoting 
Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They 
Working?, 25 AM. BUS. L.J. 241, 242 (1987)) (“Employers also often prefer 
internal reports since these reports ‘prevent the negative publicity, investigations, 
and administrative and legal actions that usually ensue after external 
whistleblowing.’”). 
 148. See Callahan et al., supra note 2, at 905 (discussing the possible benefits of 
internal disclosures). 
 149. See UNCAC, supra note 6, art. 63 (establishing the Conference of the State 
Parties to the Convention with the purpose of ensuring implementation of the 
Convention). 
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disclosures.150 
B. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION 
SHOULD CLARIFY THE APPROPRIATE TEST TO DETERMINE WHAT 
CONSTITUTES “REASONABLE BELIEF” 
Regardless of which approach the United Nations might support, 
any standard should be clear, simple, and uniform. Although the 
obstacles found within the Multiple Hurdles Approach blur the 
standard and do not create a coherent and ideal approach, the 
“disinterested observer” test that determines whether reasonable 
belief exists (the second element of the Multiple Hurdles Approach) 
is intuitive and appropriate.151 This reasonable person test has been 
advanced in many legal fields and has been considered historically 
effective.152 In addition, if the “disinterested observer” test is 
incorporated into the Reasonable Belief Approach, it would clarify 
an already easy-to-follow approach and would create a self-contained 
standard that leaves little room for misinterpretation. 
The Conference of the State Parties to the UNCAC should declare 
the “disinterested observer” test as the designated test to be used 
when determining whether reasonable belief exists. If this test is 
advanced in tandem with the Reasonable Belief Approach, State 
Parties would be able to create a streamlined judicial culture that can 
efficiently handle whistleblower cases without wasting resources on 
resolving ambiguities. 
 
 150. See, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 5, at 104 (underscoring the importance of 
effective whistleblower protection schemes so that potential whistleblowers are 
certain that they will be protected if they make a disclosure). 
 151. See Kahn v. Dep’t of Justice, 618 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(quoting LaChance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (stating that 
the proper test is whether “a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential 
facts known to and readily ascertainable by the employee [would] reasonably 
conclude that the actions of the government evidence [a violation of any law, rule, 
or regulation]”); see also Federal Circuit Bar Association, Cases and Recent 
Developments, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 269, 289-91 (1999) (suggesting that the 
“disinterested observer” test can strike a balance by acknowledging the subjectivity 
of reasonable belief while also accounting for the possibility of an ulterior motive). 
 152. See generally OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881) 
(espousing the “reasonable person” theory in civil law and touting its benefits 
versus other approaches). 
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C. INSTITUTIONS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO MONITOR AND 
FACILITATE THE PROPER APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD 
Finally, regardless of what the proper approach is and regardless 
of how it is implemented, institutions need to be established in 
Member States to ensure that the law is not being deliberately 
misapplied by corrupt entities.153 Indeed, since the purpose of 
UNCAC is to help eradicate corruption, the need for these 
institutions is most important in areas where corruption is ingrained 
and resistant to change.154 
If UNCAC directs State Parties to adopt the Reasonable Belief 
Approach and the “disinterested observer” test, these monitoring 
bodies will be doubly efficient because they can advance one, clear 
standard regardless of which jurisdiction they monitor. This way, 
Member States will have clear instructions on how to adjudicate 
whistleblower claims. Even more importantly, potential 
whistleblowers will be equipped with clarity and will therefore not 
hesitate to disclose important information that could be vital to the 
public interest.155 Indeed, in the fight against corruption, a clear, 
easy-to-follow standard coupled with a competent institution 
supporting that standard will create uniformity and help prevent 
corrupt nations, where such measures are most needed, from 
deliberately misapplying the standard. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Whistleblowers are crucial to the battle against corruption and 
other types of wrongdoing because they allow for early detection of 
such wrongdoing. As a result, nations and international organizations 
have recently begun implementing whistleblower protection 
 
 153. See MARTIN, supra note 5, at 7-8, 32-33, 35-36 (recognizing that the 
presence of institutions eases potential whistleblowers’ worries that they will face 
reprisal from disclosures because of corruption in the country). 
 154. See UNCAC, supra note 6, art. 1 (explaining that the purpose of UNCAC is 
to prevent and combat corruption by implementing effective measures, promoting 
international cooperation and assistance, and promoting integrity and 
accountability). 
 155. See MARTIN, supra note 5, at 7-8, 32-33, 35-36 (highlighting the 
importance of institutions to assure potential whistleblowers that they will not face 
reprisal). 
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schemes. UNCAC, via Article 33, is one such multinational effort. 
The meaning of “fact” in the context of Article 33 is analyzed 
differently by various Member States, of which South Africa utilizes 
the ideal approach: the Reasonable Belief Approach. By directing 
State Parties to implement this approach and to use the “disinterested 
observer” test when evaluating whistleblower claims, the global 
community will have made one momentous step forward in the battle 
to eradicate corruption.  
 
